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When Daubert is the way: The road less traveled by
his month’s subject continues with 
the issue of reliability of the methodol-
ogy used by experts in a specialized 
ield of knowledge.  In my last column,1 
I discussed Montana’s approach to 
admissibility of expert testimony under 
M.R.E. 702.  Although the federal courts 
apply the Daubert2 standard to all prof-
fered expert opinions, Montana has a 
hybrid approach, and thus is more like 
Robert Frost’s Vermont.3  While our 
version of Evidence Rule 702 retains 
its original language, the federal ver-
sion has been amended several times to 
relect Daubert, so that now there is a 
signiicant diference between the two 
current rules. Furthermore, the Montana 
Supreme Court has expressly rejected 
Daubert as the sole test for “non-novel” 
expert testimony while endorsing it for 
“novel” expert methodology. 
hus, Montana lawyers dealing with 
the admissibility of expert opinion face a 
Frostian fork in the road.  his month’s 
column deals with the road less traveled 
by: assessing expert testimony based 
on novel methodology by the Daubert 
test. he next column will identify the 
much less rare types of non-novel expert 
EVIDENCE CORNER
opinions which require diferent analy-
sis.  Ater that, I will address the ever-
thorny admissibility of hearsay through 
an expert. Finally, the last column on 
expert testimony will circle back to the 
question of who is qualiied to opine 
under Rule 702, which is an entirely 
diferent subject from the reliability-of-
methodology issue which Rule 702 and 
Daubert address.
Daubert per se applies only to 
novel methods
As detailed in the last column, the 
Montana Supreme Court irst applied 
the Daubert standard to scientiic expert 
testimony in State v. Moore4, decided 
only one year ater the U.S. Supreme 
Court Daubert decision.  In Moore, 
where the evidence involved forensic 
DNA analysis, the Court latly and with-
out qualiication, said “we, therefore, 
adopt the Daubert standard for the ad-
mission of scientiic expert testimony.”5  
Only four years later, in State v. Cline6, 
the Court took a giant step backwards, 
creating two separate forks for assessing 
expert methodology:
Certainly all scientiic expert 
“Two roads diverged in a wood, and I — I took the one less traveled by, 
And that has made all the diference.” 
−  Robert Frost, “The Road Not Taken”
testimony is not subject to 
the Daubert standard and the 
Daubert test should only be used 
to determine the admissibility 
of novel scientiic evidence. 
(Emphasis added).
275 Mont. at 55 (1996).  Two years 
ater that, the Court reiterated its rejec-
tion of Daubert as the exclusive test for 
admissibility of expert testimony:
he Ninth Circuit Court of 
Appeals, ater citing to this 
part of the Daubert decision, 
concluded that the requirements 
of Daubert “apply to all 
profered expert testimony—
not just testimony based on 
novel scientiic methods or 
evidence.” Claar v. Burlington 
Northern Railroad Co. (9th 
Cir.1994), 29 F.3d 499, 501 n. 2 
(citing Daubert, 509 U.S. at 592 n. 
11, 113 S.Ct. at 2796 n. 11). 
We disagree with this 
interpretation of Daubert and 
reassert our holding in Cline that 
the Daubert test should only 
be used to determine the 
Professor Cynthia Ford
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admissibility of novel scientiic 
evidence. Cline, 275 Mont. at 55, 
909 P.2d at 1177.
Hulse v. State, 289 Mont. 1, 29, 961 
P.2d 75, 91 (1998).
he Court unanimously reairmed 
this bifurcated approach most recently 
in 2015:
¶ 21 In contrast to its status 
in the federal system, Daubert 
is not generally applicable in 
Montana. In State v. Moore, 
(1994), we observed that Daubert 
was consistent with our previous 
precedent “concerning the 
admission of expert testimony 
of novel scientiic evidence,” 
and we adopted Daubert “for 
the admission of scientiic 
expert testimony.” Moore, 268 
Mont. at 42, 885 P.2d at 471. 
We later clariied, however, that 
Daubert does not apply to all 
expert testimony; instead, it 
applies only to “novel scientiic 
evidence.” State v. Cline, (1996); 
see Hulse v. DOJ, Motor Vehicle 
Div., (1998) (reasoning that 
because “the HGN test is not 
novel scientiic evidence,” a 
district court “need not employ” 
Daubert to determine the 
admissibility of the test results). 
(Emphasis added, citations 
omitted).
McClue v. Safeco Ins. Co. of Illinois, 
2015 MT 222, ¶ 21, 380 Mont. 204, 210, 
354 P.3d 604, 609.
hus, the key question for Montana 
litigators, whether ofering or objecting 
to expert testimony, is whether the sub-
ject of that testimony is “novel scientiic 
evidence” or not. he only way to divine 
which side of the “novel” line, and thus 
which road (Daubert or not-Daubert) 
to travel, is to sit through the Montana 
cases.  I have attempted to do that in this 
and the next column.    
‘Novel’ methodology is ‘the road 
less traveled by’
he Bible observes that “there is no 
new thing under the sun.” Ecclesiastes, 
1:9.  he Montana Supreme Court does 
not go quite that far, but close.  As the 
Court itself has stated:
We have adopted the various 
factors set forth by the United 
States Supreme Court in Daubert 
v. Merrell Dow Pharms., for 
assessing the reliability of 
profered expert testimony, but we 
limit Daubert’s application to only 
novel scientiic evidence. State v. 
Damon, 2005 MT 218, ¶ 18, 328 
Mont. 276, ¶ 18, 119 P.3d 1194, ¶ 
18. We assess novelty from a very 
narrow perspective. Damon, ¶ 
18. (Citations omitted, emphasis 
added).
State v. Clark, 2008 MT 419, ¶ 42.7 
In fact, ater reading my way through a 
myriad, if not all,8 the relevant Montana 
cases, I have concluded that in fact 
“very narrow” equals only one “novel” 
technique: narrow, indeed. I will provide 
more detail about what that novel tech-
nique is, but irst will discuss how the 
line is drawn.
Drawing the line: Novel or not?
he irst case to draw a line between 
“novel” and “non-novel” methods was 
the same case which established the 
split analysis, Cline. Shawn Cline was 
convicted of robbery, burglary and as-
sault based on a break-in at the Kountry 
Korner Cafe9 west of Bozeman. Part of 
the evidence admitted against him was 
a ingerprint of his right thumb, located 
on an envelope in the cafe’s money 
drawer.  Cline explained this ingerprint 
with two alternative theories: that he 
had worked at the café about a year 
before the break-in (so his ingerprint 
stemmed from that time), and that 
shortly before the burglary, he had given 
an envelope to his sister-in-law who still 
worked at the café. (She testiied that he 
had never given her any envelope; the 
café manager testiied that Cline had 
never had access to the till during his 
employment). At trial,
the District Court allowed Michael 
Wieners, a FBI ingerprint 
technician, to testify as to the 
age of Cline’s ingerprint found 
on the pie tin deposit envelope. 
Wieners testiied that “I think this 
is a fresh latent print probably 
about a month or two old. But, 
again, there is leeway either way.” 
Cline claims that because there is 
no reliable scientiic procedure to 
evaluate the age of a ingerprint, 
Wieners’ testimony signiicantly 
undermined his defense theory 
that the ingerprint was laid prior 
to the break-in under innocuous 
circumstances unrelated to the 
break-in.
… Cline argues on appeal 
that the prejudicial afect [sic, 
ouch] of Wieners’ testimony 
outweighed the probative value 
of the information. Cline further 
argues that Wieners’ testimony 
did not meet the criteria for the 
introduction of scientiic evidence 
in criminal cases.
275 Mont. at 54.  
On appeal, the Supreme Court dis-
tinguished between the two ingerprint 
issues in the case, holding only the aging 
technique to be novel, thus requiring a 
Daubert analysis:
It must also be noted that we 
do not consider ingerprint 
evidence in general to be novel 
scientiic evidence. However, 
in the present case the issue 
is whether it is possible to 
determine the age of a ingerprint 
utilizing magnetic powder. We 
apply the Daubert standard to 
this case because we consider 
ingerprint aging techniques 
in this context to be novel 
scientiic evidence. Certainly all 
scientiic expert testimony is not 
subject to the Daubert standard 
and the Daubert test should 
only be used to determine the 
admissibility of novel scientiic 
evidence.
275 Mont. at 55.  Unfortunately, 
the Cline Court did not explain how it 
reached its conclusion that ingerprint 
aging was novel scientiic evidence while 
ingerprint identiication was not.   
Later cases demonstrate that the two 
factors which matter most to the Court 
in deciding whether a particular method 
are novel or not are its scientiic his-
tory and its prior use in courts both in 
Montana and around the country.   In 
2003, the Court stated (out loud) that 
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“there is no set standard for determining 
whether a scientiic technique is novel,” 
but went on to identify some factors 
which seem to matter:  
¶ 38 In Hulse, we concluded that 
the Horizontal Gaze Nystagmus 
(HGN) test was not novel 
scientiic evidence, noting that for 
several decades, law enforcement 
oicials had used the HGN test, 
and that as early as 1986, the 
admissibility of the HGN test 
had been considered in other 
jurisdictions. We cited with 
approval the Minnesota Supreme 
Court comment that “the HGN 
test ‘can hardly be characterized as 
an emerging scientiic technique’ 
because nystagmus has long been 
known and the tests have been in 
common medical use for many 
years.” Hulse, ¶ 68 (citing State 
v. Klawitter (Minn.1994), 518 
N.W.2d 577, 584).
¶ 39 Likewise, we concluded in 
Southern that microscopic hair 
comparison evidence was not 
novel scientiic evidence—noting 
that since 1978 we had considered 
several cases wherein witnesses 
had testiied on such evidence and 
that comparing hair samples with 
a microscope had been done for 
decades — and therefore Daubert 
standards were not applicable 
to determine its admissibility. 
Southern, ¶ 59.
¶ 40 While it is clear from our 
prior decisions that there is no 
set standard for determining 
whether a scientiic technique 
is “novel,” we have consistently 
given credence not only to 
previous treatment of the 
technique by other cases and 
jurisdictions, but also to how 
long the technique or theory 
has been used in the scientiic 
community.  (Emphasis added).
State v. Ayers, 2003 MT 114, ¶¶ 
38-40.10  
In Ayers, the State efectively used its 
expert to convince the trial judge, and 
ultimately the Supreme Court, that the 
“Likelihood [of paternity] Ratio” (“LR”) 
was not novel so that Daubert did not 
apply:
Applying those standards here, we 
conclude that the LR is not a novel 
scientiic technique.
¶ 41 First, according to Dr. Basten, 
the widely used paternity statistic 
known as “paternity index” or 
“probabilities of paternity” is 
basically the same thing as a 
“likelihood ratio.” A “paternity 
index” calculation considers the 
genetic evidence from a mother, 
child, and putative father and 
compares the hypothesis that 
the putative father is the father 
versus the hypothesis that another 
man is the father. According to 
Dr. Basten, while the speciic 
equations might be slightly 
diferent between a paternity 
index (dealing with mother, child, 
and putative father) and the LR in 
a criminal investigation (suspect, 
victim and evidence stain), both 
involve the same theory: “you’re 
calculating the probability of what 
you see, evidence or data, given 
diferent ideas as to how it came 
about.”
¶ 42 In State v. Weeks, the State 
presented statistical analysis based 
on a paternity test to prove the 
defendant had sexual intercourse 
without consent with his thirteen-
year old stepdaughter who became 
impregnated. Weeks (1995), 270 
Mont. 63, 891 P.2d 477 (he 
statistical analysis determined 
the defendant was 154,000 times 
more likely to be the father of his 
stepdaughter’s baby). Dr. Basten, 
having reviewed Weeks, explained 
that the paternity index used in 
that case was basically a LR.
¶ 43 During the pre-trial hearing, 
Dr. Basten told the court that in 
at least six previous cases, his 
testimony was based on the LR, 
including a Montana case tried 
in 1998, State v. Swan, Fourth 
Judicial District Court, Missoula 
County, Cause No. 12594 (neither 
the admission of DNA evidence, 
nor the LR were appealed in that 
case). Moreover, Dr. Basten also 
testiied in Garcia, 197 Ariz. 79, 
3 P.3d 999, where the Arizona 
Supreme Court concluded that 
interpretation of mixed DNA 
samples using statistical formulas 
for calculating LR’s were generally 
accepted by the relevant scientiic 
community and were therefore 
admissible under Frye v. United 
States (D.C.Cir.1923), 293 F. 1013.
¶ 44 Second, we take note of many 
journal articles written on the 
topic of presenting DNA results 
which incorporate discussion 
of the LR. See, e.g., Jonathan 
J. Koehler, On Conveying 
the Probative Value of DNA 
Evidence: Frequencies, Likelihood 
Ratios, and Error Rates, 67 U. 
Colo. L.Rev. 859 (1996); William 
C. hompson, DNA Evidence 
in the O.J. Simpson Trial, 67 U. 
Colo. L.Rev. 827, 828 (1996); 
Jonathan J. Koehler, Why DNA 
Likelihood Ratios Should Account 
for Error (Even When A National 
Research Council Report Says 
hey Should Not), 37 Jurimetrics 
J. 425 (1997). (Emphasis added).
State v. Ayers, 2003 MT 114, ¶¶ 
40-44.  
In State v. Bowman11, the court held 
that an expert’s opinion on the cause of 
death of an allegedly poached elk was 
not based on novel science, even though 
only one laboratory in the world (where 
he worked) studied wildlife forensics:
he study of animal anatomy is 
not a new concept. It coincides 
with the study of human anatomy 
and can be dated back to, at the 
very least, Hippocrates (377–460 
B.C.). In addition, schools of 
veterinary science date back to the 
mid-18th Century in Europe and 
about the time of the Civil War in 
America.
¶ 40 Aside from the lengthy 
history surrounding the study 
of animal anatomy and the 
development of veterinary 
schools, Stroud's education, his 
studies, and his work experience, 
in the area to which he testiied, 
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is extensive. His education 
includes a Doctor of Veterinary 
Medicine and a Master of 
Science in veterinary science 
pathology. In addition, Stroud 
has participated in one study, 
involving seals, where numerous 
bullet wounds were observed and 
another study involving deer, “[t]
hat was speciically to determine 
wound ballistic characterization 
using various irearms.” Further, 
at the Lab he “primarily deal[s] 
with either cause of death 
or pathologic examination 
of evidence from wildlife ... 
[including] birds, eagles, hawks, 
owls, waterfowl, wolves, deer, 
elk, marine mammals, even ish.” 
Lastly, he has completed about 
10,000 necropsies, or autopsies, 
on wildlife ranging from whales 
to elk, deer, wolves, and many 
diferent birds.
2004 MT 119, ¶¶ 39-40.  Although 
there is “no set standard for determin-
ing whether a scientiic technique is 
‘novel,’” a synthesis of these cases shows 
that to successfully argue for the appli-
cation of Daubert, the opponent should 
show both that the expert’s methodol-
ogy is recent in origin, and that it has 
not been used in very many, if any, 
court cases.  
he obvious caveat is that the op-
ponent urging a Daubert analysis should 
not agree that the contested methodol-
ogy is not novel.  Sadly, that is exactly 
what sabotaged the argument in Damon 
v. State.  Damon involved a PBT, 
also known as a Preliminary Alcohol 
Screening Test (PAST), that revealed 
defendant’s blood alcohol content 
(BAC) to be 0.274.  Ater a pretrial hear-
ing on the admissibility of the PBT, the 
judge allowed it into evidence at trial.  
Damon was convicted and designated a 
persistent felony ofender.  On appeal, 
he challenged the reliability of the test 
and its admission.  he Supreme Court 
observed that:
¶ 23 Both parties in this 
case admit that the scientiic 
technology used in the Alco–
Sensor III to measure alcohol 
represents nothing new or novel. 
he instrument itself has existed 
since the 1970’s. An Austrian 
scientist initially discovered 
the fuel cell technology used in 
the Alco–Sensor III PBT in the 
1960s. We held in Southern that 
microscopic hair comparison was 
not novel because hair sampling 
with a microscope had been 
done for decades. Southern. ¶ 
59. Likewise, a PBT or PAST 
using fuel cell technology does 
not represent a novel scientiic 
technique that requires a court 
to apply the Daubert factors. 
(Emphasis added).
State v. Damon, 2005 MT 218, ¶ 23.12 
The List? 13 of novel methodologies 
in Montana
OK, here is the breaking news, at 
last.  here is only one expert methodol-
ogy that the Montana Supreme Court so 
far has held to be “novel,” requiring the 
application of Daubert per se:  
1.  Fingerprint identiication 
(Cline):
It must also be noted that we 
do not consider ingerprint 
evidence in general to be novel 
scientiic evidence. However, 
in the present case the issue 
is whether it is possible to 
determine the age of a ingerprint 
utilizing magnetic powder. We 
apply the Daubert standard to 
this case because we consider 
ingerprint aging techniques 
in this context to be novel 
scientiic evidence. Certainly all 
scientiic expert testimony is not 
subject to the Daubert standard 
and the Daubert test should 
only be used to determine the 
admissibility of novel scientiic 
evidence.
State v. Cline, 275 Mont. 46, 55, 909 
P.2d 1171, 1177 (1996).  Of course, as 
new methodologies are developed and 
ofered in Montana cases for the irst 
time, they too may be deemed “novel” 
and the suggestions below would apply 
to them as well as to ingerprint ag-
ing. he converse is also true: what 
was “novel” at the time one case was 
decided, requiring a Daubert analysis, 
may eventually ripen into “non-novel” 
once that method has met the Daubert 
standard repeatedly.  A party who wants 
to use ingerprint aging, for example, 
could research both the current scien-
tiic literature and other case law across 
the country to see what has happened 
to the technique in the 14 years since 
Cline.  If lots of scientists or courts have 
approved the technique in the interim, 
a proponent could use those facts to es-
cape Cline and Daubert. (FYI: I did do a 
quick literature check in October 2018, 
and it seems that ingerprint aging still 
would be considered “novel,” requiring 
a Daubert analysis.14  
All the other cases I have seen 
categorize the methodologies involved 
as “non-novel,” so that Daubert does 
not govern their admissibility.  Instead, 
what I have dubbed the “Montana test” 
applies, but that is not without its own 
diiculty, as we will see next month. 
How to use Daubert in a “novel 
method” case 
In Cline, the Montana Supreme 
Court referred back to Moore15, the 
case in which it originally had held that 
Daubert applied in Montana state court, 
as guidance for trial lawyers and judges:
We noted that Rule 702, 
Fed.R.Evid., still requires the 
district court to screen such 
evidence to ensure that any and 
all scientiic testimony or evidence 
admitted is not only relevant, but 
reliable. Moore, 885 P.2d at 470.
To guide the trial court’s 
assessment of the reliability of 
the scientiic evidence ofered, we 
adopted in Moore the following 
four nonexclusive factors: (a) 
whether the theory or technique 
can be and has been tested; (b) 
whether the theory or technique 
has been subjected to peer review 
and publication; (c) the known or 
potential rate of error in using a 
particular scientiic technique and 
the existence and maintenance 
of standards controlling the 
technique’s operation; and (d) 
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whether the theory or technique 
has been generally accepted or 
rejected in the particular scientiic 
ield. Moore, 885 P.2d at 470-
71 (citing Daubert, 113 S.Ct. at 
2796-97).
State v. Cline, 275 Mont. at 55–56.  
hese four factors come directly from 
the U.S. Supreme Court decision in 
Daubert: 
Faced with a profer of expert 
scientiic testimony, then, the 
trial judge must determine at the 
outset, pursuant to Rule 104(a), 
whether the expert is proposing 
to testify to (1) scientiic 
knowledge that (2) will assist 
the trier of fact to understand or 
determine a fact in issue. his 
entails a preliminary assessment 
of whether the reasoning or 
methodology underlying the 
testimony is scientiically valid 
and of whether that reasoning 
or methodology properly can be 
applied to the facts in issue. We 
are conident that federal judges 
possess the capacity to undertake 
this review. Many factors will 
bear on the inquiry, and we do 
not presume to set out a deinitive 
checklist or test. But some general 
observations are appropriate.
Ordinarily, a key question to be 
answered in determining whether 
a theory or technique is scientiic 
knowledge that will assist the trier 
of fact will be whether it can be 
(and has been) tested….
Another pertinent consideration 
is whether the theory or technique 
has been subjected to peer review 
and publication….
Additionally, in the case of a 
particular scientiic technique, 
the court ordinarily should 
consider the known or potential 
rate of error, … and the existence 
and maintenance of standards 
controlling the technique’s 
operation…
Finally, “general acceptance” 
can yet have a bearing on the 
inquiry…
he inquiry envisioned by Rule 
702 is, we emphasize, a lexible 
one. Its overarching subject is 
the scientiic validity and thus 
the evidentiary relevance and 
reliability—of the principles 
that underlie a proposed 
submission. he focus, of course, 
must be solely on principles 
and methodology, not on the 
conclusions that they generate.
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 
509 U.S. 579, 593–95 (1993).
It is possible to satisfy Daubert with-
out expressly addressing each of these 
factors.  In Cline, where the Montana 
Supreme Court held that the ingerprint 
aging opinion was based on “novel 
scientiic evidence,” requiring Daubert, 
it airmed the admission of the evi-
dence even though Judge Olson had not 
expressly applied Daubert: 
In this case, the State established 
the necessary foundation 
regarding the issue of determining 
the age of ingerprints. Wieners 
referenced and quoted a 
number of scientiic treatises 
on ingerprint technology. he 
treatises established that while 
the age of a latent print cannot 
be established with complete 
accuracy, experienced examiners 
can profer an opinion regarding 
the age of a latent print based on 
the examiner’s experience and 
investigation. he District Court, 
although not applying the Daubert 
criteria, correctly found that this 
was an area where experts could 
disagree, that the testimony would 
be subject to cross-examination, 
and that the credibility of the 
witnesses and the weight of their 
testimony should be for the jury 
to decide, not the court. Rulings 
on the admissibility of evidence 
are let to the sound discretion of 
the trial court. Moore, 885 P.2d at 
471 (citing State v. Stewart (1992), 
253 Mont. 475, 479, 833 P.2d 
1085, 1087). We conclude that the 
District Court did not abuse its 
discretion in allowing Weiners’ 
testimony regarding the age of the 
ingerprint.
275 Mont. at 56. 
he best practice, however, is to 
actually present evidence speciically ad-
dressed to each of the factors identiied 
in Daubert and adopted by the Montana 
Supreme Court in Moore and Cline.  
Because most of us16, lawyers and judges 
alike, came to law school without exten-
sive scientiic or technical backgrounds 
and certainly haven’t developed those 
during our litigation careers, it makes 
sense for each party’s expert to do this 
work.  Of course, the answers provided 
by the proponent’s and opponent’s 
experts will be contradictory, but both 
should address (ideally in a “Daubert 
hearing” on a motion in limine)
1.  he expert’s familiarity with the 
methodology behind the profered 
opinion;
2.  Whether that method can be 
tested, and why or why not;
3.  If in fact that method has been 
tested; 
4.  he results of any testing of the 
methodology;
5.  Whether the technique has been 
subject to peer review and publication, 
explaining when and where it was pub-
lished, what peer review prior to pub-
lishing occurred, and what further peer 
review resulted from the publication;
6.  Whether/what standards exist for 
the technique’s operation, and how they 
are maintained;
7.  he known or potential rate of 
error for the methodology;
8.  he degree of acceptance of this 
methodology in the ield of expertise.
I have developed this set of subjects 
from the explicit factors articulated in 
both Daubert and the Montana cases.  
As Daubert itself recognizes, those fac-
tors are not exclusive, so an advocate 
should also include any other evidence 
that tends to prove or disprove the 
ultimate issue: whether the technique is 
reliable or not. Because of the universal 
use of Daubert in the federal courts, and 
its adoption by some states, there are 
a host of practice articles which elabo-
rate in much more on establishing and 
challenging suicient reliability of an 
expert’s methodology under Daubert. 
Novel or not: Montana judges 
urged to err on side of admission
he U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in 
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Daubert was meant to, and did, broaden 
admissibility of expert opinions even 
where the methodology was not gener-
ally accepted in the ield, which was the 
requirement previously imposed by the 
supplanted Frye decision.  Similarly, the 
Montana Supreme Court has urged the 
district courts to lean on the side of ad-
mitting rather than excluding evolving 
methodologies, even as the court must 
guard against the clearly unreliable:  
When we adopted the Daubert 
test in Moore, we speciically 
noted the continuing vitality of 
Barmeyer as that case pertained 
to the scientiic evidence. In 
Barmeyer we held that “it is 
better to admit relevant scientiic 
evidence in the same manner as 
other expert testimony and allow 
its weight to be attacked by cross-
examination and refutation.” 
Barmeyer, 657 P.2d at 598 … In 
Barmeyer, we rejected the “general 
acceptance” test, holding that it 
was not in conformity with the 
spirit of the new rules of evidence. 
(Citations omitted, emphasis 
added).
Cline, 275 Mont. at 55.
In adopting the Daubert test, 
we concluded that “before a 
trial court admits scientiic 
expert testimony, there must be 
a preliminary showing that the 
expert’s opinion is premised on a 
reliable methodology.” Moore, 885 
P.2d at 471. We noted, however, 
that such an inquiry must remain 
lexible.
“Not every error in the application 
of a particular methodology 
should warrant exclusion. An 
alleged error in the application 
of a reliable methodology should 
provide the basis for exclusion 
of the opinion only if that error 
negates the basis for the reliability 
of the principle itself.”  Moore, 
885 P.2d at 471 (quoting United 
States v. Martinez (8th Cir.1993), 
3 F.3d 1191, 1198).
State v. Cline, 275 Mont. at 55–56.
he Court reiterated its prefer-
ence for admission of evidence even 
where some question exists about the 
methodology or its application:
¶ 48 We have noted that 
criticisms of speciic applications 
of procedures or concerns about 
the accuracy of test results does 
“not render the scientiic theory 
and methodology invalid or 
destroy their general acceptance. 
hese questions go to the 
weight of the evidence, not the 
admissibility.” Weeks, 270 Mont. 
at 83, 891 P.2d at 489 (citation 
omitted). Moreover, we have 
consistently stated that “it is 
better to admit relevant scientiic 
evidence in the same manner as 
other expert testimony and allow 
its weight to be attacked by cross-
examination and refutation.” 
Southern, ¶ 50 (citing Barmeyer 
v. Montana Power Co. (1983), 202 
Mont. 185, 193–94, 657 P.2d 594, 
598, overruled on other grounds 
by Martel v. Montana Power Co. 
(1988), 231 Mont. 96, 752 P.2d 
140). See also, State v. Moore 
(1994), 268 Mont. 20, 42–43, 885 
P.2d 457, 471, overruled on other 
grounds by State v. Gollehon 
(1995), 274 Mont. 116, 906 P.2d 
697 (even though the foundation 
for the State’s expert witness was 
“shaky,” the district court did 
not err in ruling the defendant’s 
objection to the DNA evidence 
went to the weight, and not the 
admissibility, of the evidence). 
Finally, “[n]ot every error in 
the application of a particular 
methodology should warrant 
exclusion. An alleged error in 
the application of a reliable 
methodology should provide the 
basis for exclusion of the opinion 
only if that error negates the basis 
for the reliability of the principle 
itself.” Moore, 268 Mont. at 42, 
885 P.2d at 471 (citation omitted).
¶ 49 While we recognized in 
Weeks, 270 Mont. at 84, 891 P.2d 
at 489 *409 (citation omitted), 
that “courts must be mindful 
that the probative value of 
statistical probabilities evidence 
is not outweighed by any unfair 
prejudicial efect,” we conclude 
that admission of Dr. Basten’s 
conclusions using the LR did not 
unfairly prejudice Ayers. At both 
the hearing on his motion in 
limine and the trial, Ayers had the 
opportunity to cross-examine Dr. 
Basten concerning the computer 
program he used to run the 
formula, his methodology, and his 
application of various sampling 
error standards. While Ayers 
identiied two expert witnesses at 
the pre-trial hearing, Ayers chose 
not to present an expert at trial to 
refute or challenge Dr. Basten’s 
calculations, methodology, or 
formulas.
¶ 50 We conclude that the 
issues concerning Dr. Basten’s 
techniques/methods went to 
the weight of the evidence, not 
its admissibility. Based on the 
foregoing, we further conclude 
the District Court did not abuse 
its discretion when it allowed Dr. 
Basten to testify using the LR.
State v. Ayers, 2003 MT 114, ¶¶ 
48-50.
Hulse, the HGN case discussed 
above, also contained a map for lawyers 
and judges:
Certainly, if a court is presented with 
an issue concerning the admissibility 
of novel scientiic evidence, as was the 
case in both Moore and Cline, the court 
must apply the guidelines set forth 
in Daubert, while adhering to the prin-
ciple set forth in Barmeyer.
 However, if a court is presented with 
an issue concerning the admissibility of 
scientiic evidence in general, the court 
must employ a conventional analysis 
under Rule 702, M.R.Evid., while again 
adhering to the principle set forth 
in Barmeyer [liberal admissibility: see 
below].
Hulse v. State, Dep’t of Justice, Motor 
Vehicle Div., 1998 MT 108, ¶ 63. 
Fighting expert evidence which is 
admitted despite its novelty 
Both the U.S. and Montana Supreme 
Courts have acknowledged the concerns 
that the lexible Daubert standard would 
allow in more expert opinions than the 
stricter general-acceptance-necessary 
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standard which preceded Daubert.  
Justice Blackmun responded directly:
Vigorous cross-examination, 
presentation of contrary evidence, 
and careful instruction on the 
burden of proof are the traditional 
and appropriate means of 
attacking shaky but admissible 
evidence. …Additionally, in the 
event the trial court concludes 
that the scintilla of evidence 
presented supporting a position is 
insuicient to allow a reasonable 
juror to conclude that the 
position more likely than not is 
true, the court remains free to 
direct a judgment, Fed.Rule Civ.
Proc. 50(a), and likewise to grant 
summary judgment, Fed.Rule Civ.
Proc. 56. (Citations omitted).
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., 
509 U.S. 579, 596 (1993).  he Montana 
Supreme Court similarly endorsed 
impeachment rather than wholesale 
exclusion of expert testimony:
In Barmeyer we held that “it is 
better to admit relevant scientiic 
evidence in the same manner 
as other expert testimony and 
allow its weight to be attacked 
by cross-examination and 
refutation.” Barmeyer, 657 P.2d 
at 598
State v. Cline, 275 Mont. at 55.  
In the “novel” ingerprint aging 
context, the opposing lawyer should irst 
object to admission the expert’s opinion 
using the Daubert factors both in cross-
examination of the proferred expert and 
in the direct of the opponent’s expert.  If 
the judge overrules the objection, those 
same tools should reappear at trial, as 
grounds for a jury argument that the 
expert’s opinion should be discounted 
or disregarded altogether because the 
methodology is “novel” and unreliable.  
Conclusion
he rarity of “novel” methodology, 
necessitating a straight application of 
Daubert, shows that this branch of the 
expert methodology trail is indeed the 
road less traveled by. Although more 
types of expert opinions based on 
developing methodologies may be held 
“novel” in the future, the only technique 
which has been categorized as novel so 
far is ingerprint aging.  
In the next column, we will explore 
the far more numerous cases holding 
that particular methods are not novel, 
and decide whether “that [classiication] 
has made all the diference.”
Cynthia Ford teaches Civil Procedure, 
Evidence, Family Law, and Remedies.  
She coached the Trial Team for 20 
years, and regularly serves on the fac-
ulty of the Advanced Trial School at the 
School of Law.
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